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1Recent research by the Institute of Public Finance shows 
that the progressivity of personal income tax (PIT) in 
Croatia is high by comparison with that in other coun-
tries and that during the period under review it actually 
grew.1 Various elements of PIT system affect the level of 
progressivity: rate structure, personal and other allow-
ances and tax credits. From 1997 to 2004, on average 
91% of the progressivity is attributable to the personal 
allowance, and 13% to the rate structure. The impact of 
other allowances and tax credits amounts to, on average, 
minus 4%, in which the negative sign means that these 
reliefs actually reduced the potential progressivity.
Since the progressive effect is achieved primarily with 
the personal allowance, the inevitable conclusion was 
that an introduction of a single rate income tax would 
greatly retain the existing progressivity. This has been 
confirmed by various simulations of the tax burden. 
Here we shall show the results of one such simulation 
and compare the distribution of the tax burden of the 
current income tax system with that in a system employ-
ing only one rate.
One rate in the income tax system
What would have happened with the distribution of the 
tax burden and with progressivity if in 2004 instead of 
the actual system a version with just a single tax rate 
had been in force? The simulated system has the fol-
lowing features, underpinned by the principles of the 
original Income Tax Law of 1994:
•  The income of taxpayer is equal to the sum of all kinds 
of income.
•  Receipts from dividends and profit shares are not 
taxed, and for the sake of comparability, in the analy-
sis this income is excluded from the basis of the real 
and of the simulated system. 
•  The tax base is equivalent to income reduced by the 
basic personal allowance and the additional allowance 
for dependents, the amounts of which are the same as 
the real allowances in 2004.
•  The system is revenue-neutral, which means that the 
same amount of tax revenue is collected with it as 
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by the real system in 2004. The necessary single rate 
comes to 18.8%, and it is calculated as the ratio of the 
tax really collected and the simulated tax basis.
Table 1 divides taxpayers into brackets according to 
their annual pre-tax incomes (column 1). Column 4 
shows the average tax rate for the real and column 6 
for the simulated system. The average tax rate grows 
with rise in incomes in the simulated system, which 
means that it is progressive. However, certain chang-
es occur with the distribution of the tax burden.  The 
average tax rate has fallen for income tax payers with 
incomes lower than 20,000 kuna, and also for those 
with incomes in excess of 100,000 kuna. The great-
est relative reduction of tax liability, of about 10 per-
centage points, would be gained by those who earn 
the most, but who in the real system pay the most 
tax, who are taxpayers with incomes greater than 
200,000 kuna.  The greatest relative increase in the 
average tax burden, of 2.4 percentage points, would 
be experienced by income tax payers with incomes 
between 50,000 and 60,000 kuna. Looked at in abso-
lute amounts, the greatest average annual increase in 
annual tax burden, of 1,410 kuna, would be felt by 
taxpayers from the income bracket from 60,000 to 
70,000 kuna.2
We should point out that Table 1 provides only aver-
age values for given income brackets. Inside each one 
of these classes there are individuals, who are treated 
very differently in the current system, and in a system 
with a single rate the rise (fall) of the burden would for 
some be greater and for some be smaller than the aver-
age for the group.
Conclusion
The main objective of a tax policy is to collect enough 
revenue concomitant with an acceptable distribution of 
the tax burden, with a high degree of simplicity and 
transparency, while keeping down to the maximum the 
costs and the detrimental effects on economic efficien-
cy. In order to meet these objectives, it is necessary to 
apply the optimum combination of elements that the tax 
system provides. Such elements are personal allowanc-
es and other reliefs and the rate structure.
Our investigation showed that personal income tax in 
Croatia is progressive, mostly as a result of the personal 
allowance effect. In other words, in order to achieve pro-
gressivity in the income tax system it would be enough 
to have just the personal allowance and a single rate of 
taxation. In the light of the debate concerning the intro-
duction of a single rate, we wanted to verify this theo-
Table 1. Comparison of the real and the simulated annual income tax burden in 2004.
Income bracket 
(in 000 kuna)
Percentage of
the population
of taxpayers
Real tax
(kuna per
taxpayer)
Real tax
a.t.r.
(%)
Simulated tax
(kuna per tax-
payer)
Simulated tax
a.t.r.
(%)
Difference 
(kuna per
taxpayer)
Difference
(in p.p.)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7=5-3. 8=6-4.
0-10 15.1 95 1.9 0 0.0 -95 -1.9
10-20 20.6 100 0.7 16 0.1 -84 -0.6
20-30 20.4 371 1.5 445 1.8 74 0.3
30-40 12.9 1,153 3.3 1,549 4.5 396 1.2
40-50 8.5 2,410 5.4 3,291 7.4 881 2.0
50-60 6.8 3,719 6.8 5,053 9.2 1,334 2.4
60-70 5.4 5,412 8.4 6,821 10.5 1,410 2.1
70-80 3.3 7,304 9.8 8,568 11.5 1,264 1.7
80-90 2.1 9,247 10.9 10,247 12.1 1,000 1.2
90-100 1.2 11,637 12.3 12,211 12.9 574 0.6
100-120 1.4 15,659 14.4 15,110 13.9 -550 -0.5
120-150 1.0 23,097 17.4 19,711 14.8 -3,386 -2.6
150-200 0.7 34,960 20.5 26,744 15.7 -8,216 -4.8
200 and up 0.7 91,156 27.4 57,182 17.2 -33,974 -10.2
Total: 100.0 2,930 8.1 2,930 8.1 0 0.0
a.t.r. – average tax rate; p.p. – percentage points.
2  The Kakwani index of progressivity for the real system comes to 0.337, and for the simulated system 0.303, which means that with the introduction of a 
single rate about 90% of the progressivity has been retained.
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retical conclusion and explore how one version of such 
a system would have affected the progressivity of the 
system and the distribution of the tax burden across the 
income brackets in 2004. With the retention of the exist-
ing personal allowance, the abolition of all other reliefs 
and with a single rate of 19%, the same amount of rev-
enue would be yielded and approximately 90% of the 
progressivity of the actual system would be retained.
Flat tax
In tax reform debates, we often hear of the flat tax con-
cept. In economic literature it refers to a proportional tax, 
i.e., a tax in which the average tax rate (tax as a propor-
tion of income) is the same for all levels of income. A 
progressive tax is one in which the average tax rate rises 
with a rise in income.
According to this definition, a single rate income tax 
that has personal allowances is not a flat tax because it 
is progressive. Let us look at the simple example given 
in the next table. The income of person A is 2,000 kuna; 
that of person B is 2,000 kuna. If both persons can cla-
im a personal allowance of 1,000 kuna, and the single 
rate comes to 20%, person A will pay 200 kuna and per-
son B 600 kuna of tax. Thus the average tax rate of per-
son B is greater than that of person A, which is a proof 
of progressivity.
Person A Person B
Income 2.000 4.000
Allowance 1.000 1.000
Tax base 1.000 3.000
Tax 200 600
a.t.r. 10% 15%
The concept of flat tax is also used for the form of taxation 
proposed by the American economists Hall and Rabushka 
in 1996, intended to replace the current system of perso-
nal and corporate income tax. The tax base of this tax is 
total corporate revenue reduced by the costs of the acqu-
isition of short-term and long-term assets. This tax obtai-
ned the name flat tax because the original intention was to 
tax the whole of taxable income with a single rate, which 
would make the system proportional.3
3  For more on the Hall and Rabushka flat tax, see Financial Theory and Practice, 29 (2) 2005, 205-207.
